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Richard Van Barriger

Idealism and Pragmatism: “Transcendent”
Validity Claims in Habermas’s Democratic Theory

Richard Van Barriger

Introduction
In her recent article “Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas's
Communicative Turn a Move in the Wrong Direction?” Maeve Cooke
examines the evolution of Jürgen Habermas’s thought over the past
five decades. According to Cooke, Habermas’s so-called
‘communicative turn’ was a necessary step in his philosophy’s
systematic attempt to derive a universal norm from the immanent
context of human practices and institutions. In her opinion, however,
Habermas’s theory is unable to achieve such “transcendence from
within” (Cooke, 2012, p. 820) due to the inherent problem of
justification in his theory’s treatment of normative validity claims.
Cooke (2012) believes that despite Habermas’s exhaustive efforts to
provide a communication-based model for an ideal theory of law, any
political theory that discredits the possibility of metaphysical truth
inevitably relinquishes the “context-transcending moment” (p. 819)
that his idea of validity is meant to capture.
I examine how Habermas derives the normative ideals of validity
in democratic will-formation from the Theory of Communicative
Action, and compare this with the approach proposed by Cooke. In
conclusion, I characterize their respective methods as mutually
exclusive in terms of their assessment of the epistemic condition of
modernity.
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Immanence and Transcendence in Critical Theory: Habermas
and the “New” Realists
Cooke is largely sympathetic towards Habermas’s overall
approach to critical theory, and shares his aspirations for a
‘deliberative
democracy’
that
emphasizes
reason-based
communication between citizens. In fact, most of her piece is devoted
to defending Habermas’s position against more recent critical
theorists such as Axel Honneth and Albena Azmanova, whom she
refers to as the “new realists” (Cooke, 2012, p. 811). Their contention
with Habermas revolves around the notion that his theory places
insufficient emphasis on “empirical subjects in the real world”
(Cooke, 2012, p. 812). In their view, a viable critical theory can
instead be formed through a method of “normative reconstruction”
(Cooke, 2012, p. 815) based on political judgments that recognize the
inherent subjectivity encountered in a complex pluralistic society.
As Cooke points out, however, these theorists’ attempt to provide
a historically-contextualized account of social freedom and ethical life
without resorting to so-called ‘ideal theory’ is anything but new.
Rather, “(the) concern to avoid abstract normative theorizing and to
investigate the actual experiences of historically situated agents is as
old as the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory itself” (Cooke,
2012, p. 813). Interestingly, Habermas himself began his career by
employing a similar method of “normative reconstruction,” (p. 815)
and, as Cooke (2012) notes, his reasons for abandoning it in favor of
“rational reconstruction” (p. 815) continue to haunt the efforts of the
new realists. Cooke traces three distinct phases of thought in
Habermas’s writing that comprise (respectively) three distinct efforts
at a normative justification for democracy: 1) a Marxist-Hegelian
approach that attempts to situate democratic norms within the material
conditions encountered in the world, 2) an epistemological approach
that seeks to grant epistemic privilege to the concept of human
benefit, and finally 3) the language-based theory of communicative
rationality that Habermas has defended since the late 1970’s. Cooke
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(2012) believes that the new realists are “too simple” (p. 812) in their
critique of Habermas, and fail to realize the extent to which their own
theories lack a rational basis for normative claims. Here she believes
Habermas is correct in confronting this problem and that “he is right
to look to human communicative practices in order to find an answer”
(Cooke, 2012, p. 816-817).
Communication and Ideals: The Limits of Rational
Reconstruction
Cooke’s own disagreement with Habermas, on the other hand,
engages his theory at the epistemological level of justification. She
maintains that while his theory contains many valuable elements for
political critique, it also falls short of its universalistic goal. As Cooke
(2012) puts it “Habermas has confronted but not yet solved the
problem of how to defend his theory’s context-transcending claims to
validity” (p. 818).
Cooke’s (2012) claim is that communicative reason ultimately
fails to invoke universal ideals or guidelines, and should instead find
its place within an intersubjective, pragmatically-comparative
approach that includes “the interplay of reason and affect:”
...[T]he ultimate reference points for normative theorizing
(transcendent objects such as truth and justice) are radically
context transcending and as such inaccessible in their
entirety to human beings; thus I posit an insurmountable gap
between truth, justice and other transcendent reference points
and the knowledge of them that is available by way of
communicative reasoning. (p. 819)
Here the question arises: why, in Cooke’s view, are these
reference points inaccessible? What are the implications of this claim
for Habermas’s theory? To address this, I will briefly outline the
Theory of Communicative Action in order to examine Habermas’s
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formulation of normative validity. In conclusion, I will return to
Cooke’s argument against such a conception of validity and examine
the implications of her own epistemic position.
Communicative Action: The Search for Validity
Habermas has always been interested in examining: 1) the
structural evolution of sociopolitical and economic systems in the
twentieth century and 2) how the conceptions of knowledge and truth
have undergone paradigmatic changes in the philosophy of science.
Habermas seeks to place the justification for his democratic model in
“postmetaphysical” terms that can accommodate what he sees as a
coevolution of law and morality in political society, and so eschews
both theological and ideological claims pertaining to human nature
and well-being. His project consists of a comprehensive analysis of
the social functions of language, drawing from other theorists such as
George Herbert Mead and J.L. Austin who explored the rational
nature of language and attempted to define its modes and structures in
communication. Habermas’s (1987) goal in this seems to be his
concern with a “formal-pragmatic description” that can be expressed
in terms of “a modern understanding of the world” (p. 62). His
contribution to political theory, then, is a model designed to avoid
ideological claims while still retaining the ability to critique and
diagnose the problems of modernity. For the purposes of the present
discussion, we are concerned with how Habermas’s (1993b) theory
develops the vitally-important concept of context-transcending
validity claims, that can appeal to universal norms “from within the
perspective of an existence situated in the world” [emphasis original]
(p. 107).
Habermas (1987) begins with examining the nature of
communicative speech acts and their functional role in social activity.
Here his goal is to establish a “communication concept of rationality”
(p. 5) that can avoid the limitations imposed upon the validity of
intuition or introspection in the twentieth century by logical
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positivism on one side and behaviorism on the other (Habermas,
1987, p. 3). Rather than become embroiled in this subject-object
debate, Habermas (1987) borrows from Mead’s theory of
communication that analyzes linguistic acts in exclusively social
terms. The latter’s concept of communicative action provides
Habermas (1987) with a functional, “nonreductionist concept of
language” that can avoid scientific modernity’s assault upon the socalled “inner phase” (p. 4) of individual experience.
Mead identifies three phases in the evolutionary development of
language that will play heavily in Habermas’s own analysis of
language:
1. Gesture mediated actions, illustrated by animal behavior,
naturally form an ontological starting point from which to study
communication and language. Here the key concept of meaning is
found to be embedded in the “functional circuit” of behavior—that is,
a gesture and response relation between organisms’ results in a “field
of meaning” (Habermas, 1987, p. 8) for its participants. This relation,
according to Habermas (1987), forms “the objective basis of the
meaning that the gesture of one participant assumes for the other”
[emphasis original] (p. 8-9).
2. Symbolically-oriented, or signal-language, refers to the
intermediate stage of language development. According to Habermas,
this phase includes three vital transformations:
a. The replacement of gestures with symbols that carry the
same meaning for both participants.
b. The emergence of communicative intent from the causal
cycle of “stimulus-response-stimulus” (Habermas, 1987, p. 9).
c. A shift in the “structure of interaction” (Habermas, 1987, p.
10) wherein participants encounter the necessary distinction
between “acts of reaching understanding and acts oriented to
success” (p. 9) (This will underwrite Habermas’s own typification
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of action-oriented speech as dependent
understanding, as will be shown below).

upon

mutual

3. Propositionally differentiated speech acts, according to Mead,
represent the final stage of linguistic evolution. Habermas (1987),
however, believes that the theory becomes mired in the categoricallyproblematic concept of “taking the attitude of the other” (p. 12), and
disagrees with Mead’s highly-complex formulation of how this
particular transition occurs. His own proposal is to utilize two
concepts already contained in Mead’s theory as a functional
differentiation in language use: action and understanding:
This problem can be dealt with if we distinguish, more
clearly than did Mead himself, between language as a
medium for reaching understanding and language as a
medium for coordinating action and socializing individuals
[emphasis mine]. (Habermas, 1987, p. 23)
Habermas’s goal here is to establish this two-track ontology as
the basis from which to analyze the nature of propositional language.
Where Mead tried to continue from the ‘bottom up’ in terms of his
causal-historical account of language, Habermas is convinced that the
former’s genetic analysis of meaning between actors provides the
conceptual tools to tackle propositional language from the ‘top down,’
so to speak. His theory of language borrows from Austin, who
distinguishes two components inherent in speech acts: propositional
and illocutionary (Habermas, 1987, p. 67).
Illocutionary Speech: The Emergence of Normative Validity
An illocutionary speech act is some statement that is actionoriented, in the words of J.C. Farnum (2001) “established as a
promise, command, avowal, etc.” (p. 33). This form of speech,
according to Habermas, is what carries the crucial concepts of
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meaning and communicative intent developed in Mead’s theory. Other
forms of language such as describing the state of affairs in the world
(i.e. locutionary) or attempting to influence others (i.e.
perlocutionary) depend upon the twofold presuppositions of mutual
understanding and action-orientation.1 Thus illocutionary speech acts
are presupposed by other modes of speech, and so possess an inherent
precedence in communication. As Habermas (1996) puts it:
“Communicative action, then depends upon the use of language
oriented to mutual understanding” (p. 18).
Here we arrive at the heart of the matter pertaining to Habermas’s
conception of validity: a universalizing ideal in language that rests on
two inherent possibilities in communicative action: consensus and
rationality. Habermas (1993a) will define these as mutuallyinterdependent features of any speech act directed towards action in
the world:
We are intuitively aware that we cannot rationally convince
anyone, not even ourselves, of something if we do not accept
as our common point of departure that all voices that are at
all relevant should be heard, that the best arguments
available given the current state of our knowledge should be
expressed, and that only the unforced force of the better
argument should determine the “yes” and “no” responses of
the participants. (p. 107)
In other words, validity is that which conforms to the universal
norms that are presupposed by the act of entering into
communication. What Habermas hopes to accomplish with this
definition is a dissolution of the tension between his concept of

1

As Farnum (2001) puts it, “processes of communication rely on an ideal
understanding of language-use that reveals the ever-present possibility of
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linguistic universality and the context of a historical-material world
that it supposed to transcend. A communication-based concept of
validity is meant to provide the tools to address both levels of this
dilemma, and consequently provide a normative ideal for political
critique:
Validity claims are Janus-faced: as universal, they outstrip
every given context; at the same time, they must be raised
and gain acceptance here and now if they are to sustain an
agreement capable of coordinating action. (Habermas,
1993b, p. 108)
Knowledge, Validity, and Metaphysics: The Epistemology of
Communicative Reason
In Habermas’s framework, although validity-claims are
analogous to truth-claims, only validity-claims retain the power of
contextual transcendence and can appeal to the (idealized) universal
norms of discourse. While there is much more to say about the
distinction between truth and validity, I hope to have provided a
minimally sufficient sense of the latter concept to enable a further
examination of Cooke’s critique. What does she mean when she says
that truth and justice are “transcendent reference points” (Cooke,
2012, p. 819) beyond the reach of communicative reasoning, and does
she provide an alternative basis for such vital concepts?
Habermas’s primary mistake, in Cooke’s (2012) view, has been
an “overreliance on rational reconstruction and excessive confidence
in the firmness of the footing on which formal pragmatics places
critical theory” (p. 816). The basis for this claim seems to arise not
only from concerns over justification, but also from Cooke’s own

coordinating action via an uncoerced, intersubjective mode of social agreement.” (p.
35).
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viewpoint of human nature as it pertains to communication.2 As she
sees it, reason-based argumentation forms but a part of individual
“shifts in perception” (Cooke, 2006, p. 111) from which political and
moral convictions are formed, and “the force of the better argument”
(Cooke, 2006, p. 105) only partially captures the elusive concept of
validity (Cooke, 2006, p. 111).
There seems to be an inescapable dilemma contained within the
parameters of this discussion when it comes to the role of religion in
the public sphere. In the case of Cooke, the implications of her
critique could not be more stark: metaphysically grounded truthclaims, such as those based in religious belief, cannot in principle be
excluded from the public process of argumentation. Whereas
Habermas’s secular concept of reason necessitates this exclusion,
Cooke believes that this is both a necessary and unwanted feature of
his theory’s attempt at postmetaphysical justification. Cooke has
admitted that her position places her at odds with much of the last two
centuries of epistemology,3 but is convinced that postmetaphysical
thinking can never justify the concept of immanent transcendence
(Habermas’s communicative reason notwithstanding). Here one must
at least credit Cooke (2012) for her forthrightness: “I make the
normativity of truth and justice partly dependent on a realm of value
that is not the result of human behavior” (p. 819).
Cooke concludes her article with two ‘speculative theses’ that
conform with neither Habermas nor the new realists. The first is the
aforementioned “insurmountable gap” (Cooke, 2012, p. 819) between
any transcendent reference point and the knowledge gained through
2

Elsewhere, Cooke has leveled several internal critiques of Habermas’s
justificatory framework that invite further examination, but I cannot address them
here.
3
See the Q&A section to Cooke’s presentation of her forthcoming paper
Cooke, M. (2011, October). Violating neutrality? Religious validity claims and
democratic legitimacy. Presentation at the Center for Global Ethics and Politics at
the Ralph Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY.
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communicative reason. The second is that communicative reasoning
retains some usefulness to critical theory in that it can “narrow”
(Cooke, 2012, p. 819) the gap between immanent facts and
transcendent norms. Given that Cooke rejects postmetaphysical
justification as a method, it is not surprising that she flatly
characterizes her views as speculative and context-specific. As she
sees it, any bottom-up, postmetaphysical theory is inherently
incomplete when formulated and justified solely as such, and “the
onus is on those who dispense with metaphysics to maintain this
context-transcending moment without it” (Cooke, 2012, p. 819).
Conclusion
In this essay I have sought to summarize the problem of
postmetaphysical justification as conceived by Habermas and Cooke,
and examine their disagreement over whether Habermas’s concept of
validity succeeds as a strategy for solving the paradox of “immanent
transcendence” (Cooke, 2012, p. 814). While there is much more to
be said for each theorist’s views on truth and justification, their
respective differences of approach seem fundamentally incompatible,
if not mutually exclusive.
In terms of practice, Cooke’s critique seems both appealing and
troubling. Her pragmatic concern over the interplay of religious and
nonreligious reasoning in public dialogue is (as Cooke notes) shared
by Habermas, as shown by his own recent work. However, the source
of their disagreement, as we have seen, rests in their treatment of
justification in the face of modernity: universality, on Cooke’s
account, is unjustifiable for any postmetaphysical theory,
communicative or otherwise. In this it seems that Cooke struggles not
only against Habermas’s model, but also the epistemic condition of
modernity itself. With an eye towards praxis, this poses a potentially
fatal problem for any normative political theory.
For this reason, Habermas remains unwilling to place his theory
in such a speculative position. He sees modernity as an irreversible
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condition, and so would rather utilize than resist its conceptual tools.
That is, where Cooke sees an “insurmountable gap” (2012, p. 819)
between communicative reason and transcendent ideals, Habermas
(1993b) instead sees communicative reason as the sole opportunity for
a new concept of transcendence:
The historicism of paradigms and world-pictures, now rife, is
a second-level empiricism which undermines the serious task
of confronting a subject who takes up a positive or negative
stance towards validity-claims... But now it is argumentative
reason itself which reveals, in the deeper layers of its own
pragmatic presuppositions, the conditions for laying claim to
an unconditional meaning. It thereby holds open the
dimension of validity-claims which transcend social space
and historical time... Without this, normality would close
herself hermetically against any experience of a solidarity
and justice that is lacking. (p. 134)
Whether or not Habermas’s approach is effective as a normative
political theory, and to what degree, will be a subject of debate for
years to come. While I see Cooke’s defense of metaphysicallyjustified validity claims as unrealizable in practice, her relatively
novel line of critique does serve to illustrate the limited number of
epistemic options available for modern political theory in general.
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